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Endorsement and Prejudice Awareness Depends on Self-Related Egalitarian
Standards and Motivations
Karolina Fetz and Tim Sven M€uller
Humboldt-Universit€at zu Berlin
ABSTRACT
In light of current egalitarian norms, it seems intuitive to assume that people endorsing eth-
nically prejudicial beliefs are largely unaware of their xenophobic content. However, a cogni-
tive consistency perspective would suggest that individuals with low anti-prejudice
standards might care less if their opinions are prejudiced. Corroborating this idea, Study 1
(N¼ 919) reveals that intra-individually the endorsement of prejudicial beliefs was negatively
related to their evaluation as xenophobic (prejudice awareness), but more so among individ-
uals with strong self-related egalitarian standards. Study 2 (N¼ 1,201) replicates these find-
ings and shows that egalitarian standards salience led to a stronger negative association
between prejudice endorsement and awareness. This suggests that low-egalitarians are less
suitable targets for awareness-raising components of anti-prejudice interventions.
In today’s societies, prevailing egalitarian norms
largely condemn ethnic prejudice1 and anti-immigrant
resentments, but nevertheless, social-psychological
research and public opinion surveys disclose that peo-
ple frequently hold prejudicial beliefs (e.g., Murray &
Marx, 2013; Schneider, 2007; Strabac & Listhaug,
2008; Zick, K€upper, & H€overmann, 2011). When try-
ing to reconcile these findings, it might seem intuitive
to suppose that individuals who explicitly endorse eth-
nically prejudicial opinions, obviously do not recog-
nize their beliefs as prejudicial in the first place, in
assuming that it is nowadays rather aversive to per-
ceive oneself as anti-egalitarian or prejudiced. In turn,
one might infer that making individuals aware of this
fact is a useful way to motivate them to reconsider
their beliefs.2 But can we really presume that people
are generally unaware of the prejudicial nature of the
opinions they personally endorse? Or might there also
be individuals who do not care so much whether they
hold ethnically prejudicial beliefs, because they do not
have personal anti-prejudice standards?
Empirical studies investigating these questions are
rather scarce. Social-psychological frameworks on con-
temporary forms of explicit ethnic prejudice (e.g.,
McConahay, 1986; Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995) sug-
gest that along with a current trend towards egalitar-
ianism it has become rather undesirable to appear as
ethnically prejudiced. In turn, it has been argued that
many people would therefore refrain from endorsing
beliefs they clearly perceive as racist. This rationale
would conversely imply that people are largely
unaware of the prejudicial nature of those beliefs that
they do endorse themselves, and that one’s own ethnic
prejudice is thus rather ‘subtle to oneself’. This would,
in other words, suggest that the endorsement of an
ethnically prejudicial statement (prejudice endorse-
ment) and the simultaneous evaluation of this belief
as xenophobic or racist (prejudice awareness) are
largely inconsistent with each other. This idea has
been indirectly corroborated by research findings
revealing that prejudice measures which receive higher
endorsement levels are also rated as more socially
acceptable or less reflective of racism (e.g., Manganelli
Rattazzi & Volpato, 2003; McConahay, 1986), and
that being confronted with one’s own prejudiced
responses has negative affective consequences (e.g.,
Fehr & Sassenberg, 2010; Monteith & Mark, 2005).
However, previous research has not directly
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investigated how people evaluate their own prejudicial
opinions, in the first place.
Approaching this matter, the current article scruti-
nizes based on two studies—one correlational and one
experimental—the inconsistency between prejudice
endorsement and prejudice awareness, in taking an
analytical and a methodological stance that explicitly
focuses on intra-individual evaluation dynamics.
Specifically, it investigates how prejudice endorsement
and prejudice awareness are internally associated
within individuals, i.e., in how far individuals evaluate
different ethnically prejudicial beliefs they might
endorse themselves as (not) xenophobic. Furthermore,
drawing on a cognitive consistency perspective (e.g.,
Festinger, 1957; Gawronski, 2012), we examine
whether prejudice endorsement and prejudice aware-
ness are not generally inconsistent, but whether this
might depend on individuals’ standards and motiva-
tions condemning or condoning the personal endorse-
ment of ethnic prejudice (Study 1 and 2) or on the
salience of such egalitarian standards (Study 2).
Especially highly egalitarian individuals (or individuals
for whom egalitarianism is made salient) might more
strongly critically monitor their own beliefs and might
only endorse prejudicial beliefs to the extent that they
are unaware of their xenophobic nature, as it would
otherwise collide with personal (or salient) anti-
prejudice standards.
These studies seek to provide insights into cogni-
tive processes behind the subtlety of ethnic prejudice
and to further illuminate which individuals are the
most suitable target group for components of inter-
ventions aimed at combating ethnic prejudice by rais-
ing awareness of own prejudicial beliefs. Moreover, in
drawing on data from two large German population
samples, we aim to provide a more representative pic-
ture of these prejudice-related cognitive mechanisms,
which we consider especially important with regard to
current debates on the generalizability and contextual-
ization of social-psychological research findings
(Pettigrew, 2018).
The subtlety of contemporary ethnic prejudice
The idea that many people would rather not endorse
beliefs they define as racist or reflective of ethnic
prejudice is implied within a variety of social-
psychological approaches on contemporary forms of
explicit ethnic prejudice, which start from the com-
mon assumption that ethnic prejudice now appears in
subtler guises that circumvent egalitarian anti-
prejudice norms in today’s societies (e.g., Henry &
Sears, 2002; Kinder & Sears, 1981; McConahay, 1986;
McConahay, Hardee, & Batts, 1981; Pettigrew &
Meertens, 1995). One of the main goals of these
frameworks, such as modern racism (McConahay,
1986; McConahay et al., 1981), and subtle prejudice
(Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995), was the development of
new self-report measures that are less reactive, in con-
taining items which are less readily perceived to be in
conflict with norms condemning ethnic prejudice.
Higher levels of endorsement for these new prejudice
measures—compared to a lower endorsement of more
old-fashioned ethnically prejudicial beliefs—were
thereby taken as an indicator of their subtlety. Behind
this inference lies the assumption—which might also
be conceptualized as linked to the basic tenets of cog-
nitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957)—that many
people would nowadays want to maintain an egalitar-
ian, unprejudiced self-image for themselves (but also
in front of others), and would thus rather not endorse
‘blatant’ beliefs on self-report (i.e., explicit) measures,
they evaluate as racist (e.g., McConahay, 1986, p. 100;
Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995, p. 73; see also Pearson,
Dovidio, & Gaertner, 2009, regarding the discussion
on the desirability of the maintenance of an egalitar-
ian self-image related to more implicit forms of
racism). This conversely implies that those ethnically
prejudicial beliefs which many individuals do expli-
citly endorse are rather ‘subtle’, in being largely not
perceived by them as racist or xenophobic. In that
vein, this rationale of approaches on subtle forms of
explicit ethnic prejudice to some degree suggests an
inconsistency of prejudice endorsement and prejudice
awareness, which implicitly relies on the supposition
of an internal self-monitoring or balancing process,
whereby many individuals indicate their (dis)agree-
ment with a prejudicial statement also based on their
concurrent evaluation of this statement as (not) being
reflective of ethnic prejudice.
Yet, only a limited number of studies have directly
investigated this rationale. Crandall, Eshleman, and
O’Brien (2002), for instance, found a nearly perfect,
positive relationship between endorsement and social
acceptability ratings for a variety of different social
prejudices, indicating that the higher a prejudice is on
average endorsed, the more it is regarded as socially
acceptable. Similarly, other studies showed that items
belonging to measures of contemporary ethnic preju-
dice, which commonly receive higher levels of
endorsement compared to old-fashioned prejudice
scales, were indeed subtler, in being rated as more
socially acceptable or less racist than old-fashioned
prejudice items (Manganelli Rattazzi & Volpato, 2003;
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McConahay, 1986; McConahay et al., 1981; Pettigrew
& Meertens, 1996). Taken together, these studies
indeed indicate an inconsistency between prejudice
endorsement and prejudice awareness, mirrored by
their negative association, on the level of specific preju-
dicial statements. Thus, they show from a social-
normative perspective that prejudicial statements that
are on average more strongly endorsed are on average
also subtler in being perceived as more socially
acceptable or less racist.
However, in operating at the item level, these stud-
ies remain inconclusive on whether prejudice endorse-
ment and prejudice awareness are inconsistent on an
individual level, i.e., whether a higher endorsement of
a prejudicial statement is similarly associated with a
lower degree of awareness of its xenophobic content
within respondents. Hence, they do not disclose
whether one’s own prejudice is also rather ‘subtle to
oneself’, in the sense that individuals, for themselves,
do mostly not evaluate the beliefs they personally
endorse as xenophobic or racist. Such an analytical
shift to an intra-individual perspective is however cru-
cial, especially with regard to interventions that are
based on the idea that making people aware of their
own (ethnically) prejudicial beliefs is a useful means
to combat such opinions. The only study that has to
our knowledge touched upon this question focused on
sexist prejudice. Swim, Mallett, Russo-Devosa, and
Stangor (2005) found that individuals with higher
endorsement levels on different sexism measures,
showed, on average, lower awareness for the prejudi-
cial nature of the same measures, in judging them less
sexist. However, in employing aggregated scale scores
per respondent within this study, it still remains
uncertain to which degree the individual endorsement
of a specific prejudicial statement (or prejudice item)
is specifically related to the degree to which that same
statement is evaluated as prejudicial.
In sum, these findings provide first indirect support
for an inconsistency between prejudice endorsement
and prejudice awareness, empirically reflected by their
negative association. This might tentatively suggest
that individuals indeed engage in a critical self-
monitoring of own beliefs, explicitly endorsing ethnic-
ally prejudicial only to the degree that they are
unaware of their xenophobic nature. Nevertheless,
especially with regard to ethnic prejudice, there is a
lack of research investigating whether the endorse-
ment of a prejudicial statement is really unlikely to
coincide with the evaluation of the same statement as
xenophobic, by taking an analytical as well as a meth-
odological stance that directly addresses this idea on
an intra-individual level. This is however crucial in
order to open the black box of cognitive processes
behind the subtlety of one’s own ethnic prejudice.
The affective costs of prejudice awareness
depend on personal egalitarian standards
Further indirect evidence for the idea that one’s own
ethnic prejudice might be generally rather subtle to
oneself and that people are likely to be rather unaware
of the prejudicial nature of those beliefs they person-
ally endorse stems from studies that have examined
the fruitfulness of combating prejudice by inducing
awareness of own prejudice-related responses. This
line of research can be conceptualized as exploiting
the fact that people strive to achieve consistency
between different values or beliefs they hold as well as
behaviors they exhibit, as it has been put forward
within cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957)—
and in a comparable manner also in related theoret-
ical frameworks such as self-discrepancy theory
(Higgins, 1987) or symbolic self-completion theory
(Wicklund & Gollwitzer, 1981, 1982), which propose
that individuals seek to reduce discrepancies between
their current self-perception and important, aspired
self-definitions or states of the self they seek to attain.
Within this research, it is suggested that confronting
people with the fact that own responses are reflective
of (ethnic) prejudice and potentially violate personal
egalitarian standards can cause negative self-directed
emotions. In turn, this negative affective state is con-
sidered to act as a motivator for individuals to control
prejudiced responses. Within some of these studies,
participants are, for instance, provided with feedback
of having supposedly exhibited prejudiced responses
or discriminatory behavior (e.g., Fehr & Sassenberg,
2010; Monteith, 1993), while in other studies, people
are asked to critically self-reflect how they should and
would respond in certain prejudice-related scenarios
(e.g., Devine et al., 1991; Voils, Ashburn-Nardo, &
Monteith, 2002; Zuwerink, Devine, Monteith, & Cook,
1996). Overall, it is a stable empirical finding that pin-
pointing (supposed) prejudiced responses leads to
negative self-directed affect, i.e., in Allport’s (1954) or
Festinger’s (1957) words ‘compunction’ or ‘cognitive
dissonance’, only (or more strongly) for low-preju-
diced individuals and people with strongly internal-
ized anti-prejudice standards (e.g., Fehr & Sassenberg,
2010; see also Monteith & Mark, 2005, for a review),
causing especially these individuals to initiate preju-
dice-related self-regulation mechanisms (e.g., Fehr &
Sassenberg, 2010; Monteith, 1993). This is in line with
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cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957), since
prejudiced reactions should represent a discrepancy or
inconsistency with personal values only for individuals
with strong egalitarian anti-prejudice standards.
Taken together, although these findings provide an
important starting point for anti-prejudice interven-
tions, in revealing that making people aware of their
own prejudicial responses can be a useful means to
combat (ethnic) prejudice, also this line of previous
research did not directly examine how people evaluate
their own prejudiced responses—especially their con-
sciously endorsed, explicit prejudicial opinions—for
themselves. More specifically, and with regard to the
current research question, these studies do not dis-
close, whether prejudice endorsement and prejudice
awareness are, in the first place, inconsistent, in the
sense that most people are initially and prior to
potential interventions, largely unaware of the (ethnic-
ally) prejudicial nature of their own beliefs. Of course,
the empirical results revealing the aversive emotional
consequences of confronting people with their
(alleged) prejudice-related responses can, on the one
hand, be interpreted as indirect evidence that many
individuals are indeed unaware that the prejudicial
beliefs they do personally endorse are actually reflect-
ive of (ethnic) prejudice. Yet, on the other hand, the
finding that such interventions cause negative affect
particularly (or only) for highly egalitarian individuals
also suggests that simultaneous prejudice endorsement
and prejudice awareness might not be equally incon-
sistent for all people. Especially individuals with
standards and values that condemn the personal
endorsement of (ethnic) prejudice might more
strongly monitor their explicit beliefs as potentially
prejudiced and might initially be more strongly con-
vinced that their own ethnically prejudicial beliefs are
not xenophobic, in assuming that they would not
endure the otherwise resulting negative affective state
of cognitive dissonance.
A cognitive consistency approach to the
subtlety of one’s own ethnically
prejudicial beliefs
Expanding this idea, the studies presented here focus
on intra-individual cognitive processes and seek to
directly investigate in how far people privately do or
do not evaluate the ethnically prejudicial beliefs they
personally and explicitly endorse as xenophobic.
Moreover, in drawing on a cognitive consistency per-
spective the current research examines whether the
supposed inconsistency between prejudice
endorsement and prejudice awareness, which would
be reflected by a negative intra-individual association,
might be determined by personal values, standards or
motivations that condemn or condone the own
endorsement of ethnic prejudice (Study 1 and 2) or
the salience of such standards (Study 2).
Following the rationale put forward by Gawronski
and colleagues (e.g., Gawronski, 2012; Gawronski &
Bodenhausen, 2014; Gawronski & Brannon, 2019;
Gawronski, Peters, Brochu, & Strack, 2008; Gawronski
& Strack, 2004), which was based on cognitive disson-
ance theory (Festinger, 1957), we apply a cognitive
consistency framework to prejudice-related belief sys-
tems and regard cognitive (in)consistency as a propos-
itional process: Two or more propositional beliefs that
are logically related to each other and are (subjectively
perceived as) true or false can be (in)consistent with
each other, potentially causing the negative affective
state of cognitive dissonance. Transferring this idea to
the context of the current study, one could regard the
explicit endorsement of an ethnically prejudicial state-
ment (prejudice endorsement) and the explicit evalu-
ation of the same statement as xenophobic (prejudice
awareness) as two inter-related propositional beliefs
that can be subjectively evaluated as true or false. For
instance, individuals could or could not endorse an
ethnically prejudicial belief (e.g., “Most migrants living
here who receive support from welfare could
get along without it if they tried”, i.e., an item adapted
from Pettigrew and Meertens’ (1995) Blatant Prejudice
Scale), i.e., assign it a positive or negative truth value.
Concurrently, individuals can evaluate that same belief
as xenophobic or not xenophobic, and could thus, in
this example, judge the proposition ‘The statement
Most migrants living here who receive support
from welfare could get along without it if they tried
is xenophobic’ as true or false. Although one might
intuitively regard the simultaneous agreement with
these two statements, indicating concurrent prejudice
endorsement and prejudice awareness, as contradict-
ory, these two beliefs are from the perspective of
propositional logic by themselves neither consistent
nor inconsistent with each other, regardless of the
truth values assigned to them. However, one could
argue, that their logical relationship (or rather
‘psycho-logical’ relationship, see e.g., Gawronski &
Brannon, 2019) is defined by personal values, stand-
ards or motivations which specify in how far being
personally unprejudiced is actually important to an
individual. One could hereby, on the one hand, think
of one’s internal motivation to respond without preju-
dice (IM; Plant & Devine, 1998), a standard to avoid
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prejudice derived from internalized anti-prejudice
norms, the general egalitarian self-perception (ES),
and humanitarianism-egalitarianism (HE; Katz &
Hass, 1988), a value orientation emphasizing equality
and social justice, as individual difference variables
condemning the private endorsement of ethnic preju-
dice. On the other hand, social dominance orientation
(SDO; e.g., Ho et al., 2012; Ho et al., 2015; Pratto,
Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994; Sidanius, Pratto,
& Bobo, 1996), as an ideological preference for group-
based hierarchies, external motivation to respond
without prejudice (EM; Plant & Devine, 1998), a
standard to respond unprejudiced due to external
social pressure,3 and protestant work ethic (PWE;
Katz & Hass, 1988), a value orientation emphasizing
individual responsibility for one’s success or failure,
would be individual difference variables which con-
done the private endorsement of ethnic prejudice.
Treating such standards and motivations as
propositional beliefs themselves (e.g., “I attempt to act
in nonprejudiced ways toward migrants because it is
personally important to me”, i.e., an item adapted
from Plant and Devine’s (1998) IM scale), their
endorsement or rejection, respectively, in combination
with the truth values assigned to the other two propo-
sitions could result in an inconsistent belief system.4
Approaching the question of whether individuals are
likely to be unaware of their own ethnic prejudice
from a cognitive consistency perspective, Figure 1
schematically depicts four possible intra-individual
belief systems, starting from the assumption that an
individual endorses an ethnically prejudicial belief
(Proposition A is true, prejudice endorsement). If an
individual at the same time endorses standards that
condemn personal prejudice endorsement
(Proposition C is true), evaluating the own prejudicial
belief as xenophobic (Proposition B is true, prejudice
awareness) should collide with personal values,
Figure 1. Schematic representation of prejudice-related belief systems and their (in)consistency comprising the endorsement of an
ethnically prejudicial belief, the awareness that this belief is reflective of ethnic prejudice, and the endorsement of egalitarian val-
ues and motivations. Note. Panel A represents an inconsistent belief system; Panels B, C, and D represent consistent belief systems.
This representation was developed based on the work of Gawronski et al. (2008).
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resulting in cognitive inconsistency and ultimately
cognitive dissonance (Panel A). Thus, if highly egali-
tarian individuals endorse an ethnically prejudicial
statement, the internal belief system is only consistent
if they evaluate this ethnically prejudicial belief at the
same time as not xenophobic (Proposition B is false,
no prejudice awareness; Panel B). On the other hand,
for individuals who reject standards that condemn
personal prejudice endorsement (Proposition C is
false), whether or not one privately evaluates the
prejudicial beliefs one endorses as xenophobic should
not collide with own values and should thus not affect
the consistency of the belief system (Panel C and D).
The same logic would apply for individuals rejecting
or endorsing values and standards, respectively, that
condone personal prejudice endorsement.
Thus, from this cognitive consistency perspective,
one could argue that the (logical) inconsistency of
prejudice endorsement and prejudice awareness
depends on individual (anti-)egalitarian values and
motivations that condemn or condone personal
endorsement of ethnic prejudice, and that their intra-
individual association might thus be moderated by
such standards. On the one hand, individuals with
strong standards condemning (and low standards con-
doning) personal prejudice endorsement might more
strongly engage in a self-monitoring of their own
beliefs as potentially prejudiced, as this is relevant for
the consistency of their belief system. Hence, when
indicating their endorsement with a statement, they
might more strongly simultaneously consider whether
this utterance is reflective of ethnic prejudice. In turn,
these individuals might only explicitly endorse preju-
dicial beliefs to the extent that they are unaware of
their xenophobic nature and might more strongly
evaluate those prejudicial beliefs they do endorse as
not xenophobic (Panel B), assuming that they would
not endure the cognitive dissonance that would result
from the otherwise inconsistent belief system. Thus,
since for highly egalitarian individuals prejudice
endorsement and prejudice awareness are indeed
(logically) inconsistent with each other, one could
expect them to exhibit a stronger negative intra-
individual relationship between prejudice endorsement
and prejudice awareness. In contrast, one could argue
that people with low standards condemning (and high
standards condoning) personal prejudice endorsement
might less strongly self-monitor their beliefs and con-
sider whether they think that the beliefs they privately
endorse are xenophobic, as this is less relevant for the
consistency of their belief system. Thus, since for
these less egalitarian individuals the explicit
endorsement of a prejudicial statement and its simul-
taneous evaluation as xenophobic are not logically
inconsistent with each other and should not cause
cognitive dissonance, one could expect that for them,
prejudice endorsement and prejudice awareness would
be intra-individually more unrelated.
Overall, such potential differences in the intra-
individual association of prejudice endorsement and
prejudice awareness could serve as an important indi-
cator for the suitability of those components of anti-
prejudice interventions that aim to combat ethnic
prejudice by raising awareness of own prejudicial
beliefs, as these can only be a reasonable means for
the reduction of explicit ethnic prejudice in the real
world for individuals who are actually unaware of the
prejudicial nature of their beliefs beforehand.
Overview
In sum, it is the goal of the current research to examine
within two studies, whether individuals’ own ethnic
prejudice is generally subtle to oneself, in the sense that
people are mostly unaware of the prejudicial nature of
the beliefs they personally and explicitly endorse. More
specifically, we explore whether prejudice endorsement
and prejudice awareness are inconsistent in investigat-
ing their intra-individual association, i.e., in how far
the endorsement of different ethnically prejudicial
statements is related to the evaluation of the same state-
ments as xenophobic within individuals. Employing a
cognitive consistency perspective, we further seek to
examine whether this relationship between prejudice
endorsement and prejudice awareness might depend on
individual (anti-)egalitarian standards (Study 1 and 2)
and might thus also be affected by the temporary sali-
ence of such standards (Study 2).
Study 1
In Study 1, we investigate based on correlational survey
data, how prejudice endorsement and prejudice aware-
ness are intra-individually associated and in how far this
relationship is determined by individual (anti-)egalitarian
standards and motivations condemning or condoning
the personal endorsement of ethnic prejudice. Based on
previous findings, we generally expect a negative associ-
ation of prejudice endorsement and prejudice awareness
and predict that the more individuals endorse an
ethnically prejudicial belief, the less they would evaluate
this belief as xenophobic. However, from a cognitive
consistency perspective, we hypothesize that this
intra-individual association is moderated by individual
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(anti-)egalitarian standards. Specifically, we predict that
with increasing values, standards and motivations that
condemn, i.e., IM, ES, and HE, and decreasing standards
that condone the private endorsement of ethnic preju-
dice, i.e., SDO, EM, and PWE, individuals would more
strongly engage in a self-monitoring of their own beliefs
as potentially prejudiced and exhibit a stronger negative
association between prejudice endorsement and preju-
dice awareness. Conversely, we expect that with lower
standards that condemn and higher standards that con-
done the private endorsement of ethnic prejudice, preju-
dice endorsement and prejudice awareness would
become less negatively associated and more unrelated
within respondents.
Method
Participants and procedure
Data for the current study were collected as part of a
larger telephone survey on attitudes towards migration
and ethnic minorities among adults in Germany (Fetz
& Kroh, 2019), conducted by a professional survey
institute. Telephone surveys have the advantage that
they allow to draw a probability sample of the general
population, which increases the external validity of
the study compared to other survey modes with con-
venience samples.5 Also, compared to face-to-face
interviews that permit probability sampling as well,
telephone surveys are associated with lower social
desirability bias (e.g., Schwarz, Strack, Hippler, &
Bishop, 1991).
With regard to the measures relevant for the cur-
rent study, the survey procedure was as follows: In
the first part of the interview, respondents indicated
their agreement with different prejudice items that
varied in the strength of their prejudicial content
(prejudice endorsement). Then, socio-demographic
characteristics were obtained. After that, participants
were informed that they would now be exposed to the
same prejudice items they had evaluated beforehand,
but should now give a different judgment, indicating
in how far they evaluate these statements as xenopho-
bic (prejudice awareness). Individual difference varia-
bles were assessed in the last part of the interview.
Participation in the survey was entirely voluntary,
respondents received no compensation for participa-
tion and could quit the interview at any time.
After excluding 60 cases with missing values on the
individual difference variables in order to keep the
sample constant across all statistical models, and one
participant with only missing values on the main out-
come variable, the final random population sample
for our analyses comprised 919 participants
(465 women, 452 men, 2 diverse/no indication; Mage
¼ 49.54 years, SD¼ 16.47, age range: 18–87 years).
Measures
Level 1 variables (item ratings nested within
respondents)
Prejudice endorsement. Two items each were selected
from the Subtle and Blatant Prejudice Scale (Pettigrew
& Meertens, 1995), translated into German (following
the translation provided by Zick, 1997) and rephrased
to assess prejudice towards migrants in Germany.
Items from both scales, thus differing in the strength
of the prejudicial content, were chosen in order to
achieve sufficient within-subject variation in item rat-
ings, which was essential for the purpose of the study.
Additionally, the item selection was based on the
premise that the wording needed to be logically sound
for endorsement as well as awareness ratings (see
below). The four employed items were: “Migrants
have jobs that the Germans should have”, “Most
migrants living here who receive support from welfare
could get along without it if they tried”, “It is just a
matter of some people not trying hard enough. If
migrants would only try harder they could be as well
off as German people”, and “Migrants living here
teach their children values and skills different from
those required to be successful in Germany”.
Participants indicated their agreement with the preju-
dice items on a 1 (completely disagree) to 5 (completely
agree) scale. Mean endorsement ratings and standard
deviations for the four items were M¼ 1.75,
SD¼ 1.05; M¼ 2.01, SD ¼ 1.14; M¼ 2.56, SD ¼ 1.30;
M¼ 2.74, SD ¼ 1.21, respectively.
Prejudice awareness. Afterwards, participants indi-
cated for the same four prejudice items, in how far
they evaluate these as xenophobic on a 1 (not xeno-
phobic at all) to 5 (very xenophobic) scale.6 Mean
awareness ratings and standard deviations for the four
items were M¼ 3.91, SD ¼ 1.16; M¼ 3.70, SD ¼ 1.20;
M¼ 3.51, SD¼ 1.31; M¼ 3.07, SD¼ 1.19, respectively.
Endorsement and awareness ratings for the preju-
dice items were treated as separate observations clus-
tered within individuals in our analyses and were thus
not averaged per respondent.
Level 2 (individual difference) variables
For all individual difference measures, respondents
indicated their agreement with the respective items on
a 1 (completely disagree) to 5 (completely agree) scale.
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Internal and external motivation to respond without
prejudice. Participants’ motivations to respond with-
out prejudice were assessed with two items each from
the IM (Plant & Devine, 1998; e.g., “I attempt to act
in nonprejudiced ways toward migrants because it is
personally important to me”) and the EM scale (e.g.,
“I attempt to appear nonprejudiced toward migrants
in order to avoid disapproval from others”). Items
were translated into German and rephrased to assess
motivations to control prejudice towards migrants.
The two IM (M¼ 4.53, SD¼ 0.74, a¼ .75) and EM
(M¼ 3.24, SD¼ 1.25, a¼ .55) items were averaged for
each individual.7
Egalitarian self-perception. Respondents’ ES was
measured with one item (“I am a person to whom
equality of all groups in our society is important”;
M¼ 4.51, SD¼ 0.79).
Social dominance orientation. SDO was assessed
with a German translation of the 8-item SDO7(s)-Scale
(Ho et al., 2015; e.g., “An ideal society requires some
groups to be on top and others to be on the bottom”;
M¼ 1.89, SD¼ 0.64, a¼.69).
Humanitarianism-egalitarianism. HE was assessed
with six items from Doll and Dick’s (2000) German
adaptation of the HE scale (Katz & Hass, 1988; e.g.,
“Those who are unable to provide for their basic
needs should be helped by others”; M¼ 4.28,
SD¼ 0.58, a¼ .71).
Protestant work ethic. Endorsement of PWE was
measured with a German adaptation of the four items
employed by Levin, Sidanius, Rabinowitz, and
Federico (1998; e.g., “Most people who don’t get
ahead should not blame the system; they really
have only themselves to blame”; M¼ 2.59,
SD¼ 0.76, a¼ .70).
Data structure and analytic strategy
The current study aims to assess the intra-individual
association of the endorsement of the four prejudice
items of different strength and the evaluation of the
same items as xenophobic (prejudice awareness), and
in how far this relationship depends on personal
standards and motivations. In order to be able to ana-
lyze the covariation of prejudice endorsement and
prejudice awareness within individuals, we trans-
formed the data into longitudinal format, with each
row representing the endorsement and awareness
ratings for the different prejudice items as paired
repeated measurements clustered within respondents.
This resulted in a two-level hierarchical data structure:
After the exclusion of missing observations using list-
wise deletion, 3,588 paired endorsement and aware-
ness ratings (level 1) were nested within 919
respondents (level 2). Employing multilevel analyses
(Snijders & Bosker, 2012), we first calculated multi-
level models (maximum likelihood estimation) with
respondent-specific intercepts and slopes in order to
assess in how far the endorsement of a prejudice item
predicted the awareness rating for the same item
within participants. Prejudice awareness was entered
as the outcome and prejudice endorsement as the pre-
dictor variable in the models.8 In order to examine
how the intra-individual association between prejudice
endorsement and prejudice awareness (i.e., the indi-
vidual slope) varied between individuals depending on
respondents’ values and motivations, we then esti-
mated multilevel models including cross-level interac-
tions with respondent characteristics (level 2 variables;
i.e., IM, ES, SDO, EM, HE, PWE). The covariance
between the random effects was not restricted.
Beforehand, the outcome and all predictor variables
were z-standardized on their respective level of ana-
lysis. All multilevel models were estimated using the
xtmixed command for multilevel regression models in
Stata (Version 15.1; StataCorp, 2017).
Results
Exploring the hierarchical data structure, we first cal-
culated an unconditional model with prejudice aware-
ness as the outcome variable and no explanatory
variables being entered (Model 0; see Table 1). Results
from this null model confirmed that an adequate
amount of variance existed on both levels. The esti-
mated random effects parameters showed that
respondents sufficiently varied in their awareness rat-
ings provided for the different prejudice items (vari-
ance within respondents), and participants
substantially differed from each other in their mean
level of prejudice awareness across these items (vari-
ance between respondents). The intraclass correlation
(ICC) coefficient indicated that a high proportion of
43.76% of the variance in awareness ratings could be
attributed to the respondent level, i.e., participants
tended to evaluate the four prejudice items
quite similarly.
In the next step, we calculated multilevel models
with prejudice awareness as the outcome variable and
the endorsement for the prejudice items as the main
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predictor variable on level 1. The ‘raw’, average intra-
individual effect of prejudice endorsement on preju-
dice awareness, based on a model without any control
variables, was negative—as expected—and of moderate
size (b ¼ .412, SE ¼ .017; see Table 2 for an over-
view on the simple intra-individual effects of prejudice
endorsement on prejudice awareness estimated for
Study 1 and Study 2). We then included a categorical
control variable for the specific prejudice items in the
models for the main analyses, which are reported
hereafter (Models 1–8; see Table 1). Further corrobo-
rating our hypothesis, results from Model 1 revealed a
negative main effect of prejudice endorsement on
prejudice awareness (b ¼ .347, SE ¼ .017), i.e., a
moderate negative intra- individual association
between prejudice endorsement and awareness. Thus,
the more individuals endorsed a prejudicial belief, the
less they evaluated the same belief as xenophobic. The
random slope estimate indicated that this negative
association between prejudice endorsement and preju-
dice awareness varied between respondents with a
standard deviation of .241, i.e., within a ±1.96 SD
range of [.819; .125]. Thus, the intra-individual asso-
ciation of endorsement and awareness ratings was
estimated to range from a stronger negative relation-
ship to a complete unrelatedness between
respondents.
In a second step, we examined in how far the
intra-individual relationship between prejudice
endorsement and prejudice awareness might differ
between respondents, in being moderated by individ-
ual difference (level 2) variables. For this purpose, we
first calculated separate multilevel models with preju-
dice awareness as the outcome and prejudice endorse-
ment as the predictor variable on level 1, now
including the respective individual difference (level 2)
variables and most importantly the cross-level inter-
action terms between these individual difference varia-
bles and prejudice endorsement (Models 2–7). In line
with our hypotheses, results from Models 2–6 revealed
small interaction effects between endorsement ratings
and IM, ES, SDO, EM, and HE respectively, on aware-
ness ratings. Within respondents with higher IM, an
increase in the endorsement of a prejudice item was
more strongly related to a decrease in prejudice
awareness for the same item (b¼.051, SE ¼ .015).
Similarly, with higher individual levels of ES, the
intra-individual association between prejudice
endorsement and prejudice awareness became more
pronounced and negative (b¼.051, SE ¼ .015).
Consequently, at lower levels of IM and ES, the
endorsement of prejudice items less strongly Ta
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negatively predicted the awareness ratings for the
same items within individuals. In contrast, with
increasing SDO, endorsement and awareness ratings
were intra-individually less negatively associated and
more unrelated (b¼ .033, SE ¼ .016). Similarly, with
higher EM, an increase in the endorsement of a preju-
dice item was less strongly associated and more unre-
lated to the awareness ratings for the same item
(b¼ .048, SE ¼ .016). In turn, at lower levels of SDO
and EM, the endorsement of prejudice items was
more strongly negatively associated with the awareness
ratings for the same items within respondents. A very
small interactive effect was found for HE (b¼.020,
SE ¼ .016). In order to make the size of these cross-
level interaction effects more tangible, simple slope
analyses were conducted that illustrate the difference
in the effect of prejudice endorsement on prejudice
awareness for individuals at lower (1 SD) as well as
higher (þ1 SD) levels of IM, ES, SDO, EM, and HE.
The association between prejudice endorsement and
prejudice awareness differed for individuals who are
low (b¼.279, SE ¼ .022) and high (b ¼ .380,
SE ¼ .024) in IM by .101, for individuals who are low
(b ¼ .284, SE ¼ .022) and high (b ¼ .386, SE ¼
.024) in ES by .102, for individuals who are low (b ¼
.365, SE ¼ .025) and high (b¼.298, SE ¼ .023) in
SDO by .067, for individuals who are low (b ¼ .398,
SE ¼ .025) and high (b ¼ .302, SE ¼ .023) in EM
by .096, and for individuals who are low (b¼.309,
SE ¼ .023) and high (b¼.350, SE ¼ .024) in HE by
.041. These simple slope analyses reveal that the asso-
ciation between prejudice endorsement and prejudice
awareness remains negative at both, low and high lev-
els of IM, ES, SDO, EM and HE, but that its strength
varies at different levels of the moderators. Contrary
to our hypotheses, the interactive effect of prejudice
endorsement and PWE on prejudice awareness was
negligible (b¼.009, SE ¼ .016; Model 7). Taken
together, the results of Models 2–6 suggest that with
increasing levels of IM, ES, and HE, and with decreas-
ing levels of SDO and EM, individuals more strongly
evaluated the prejudicial beliefs they endorsed them-
selves as not xenophobic. Conversely, for individuals
with lower IM, ES, and HE, and higher SDO and EM,
the endorsement of a prejudicial statement was less
strongly negatively associated and more unrelated to
its evaluation as xenophobic.
In the final step, we calculated a full model (Model
8), with prejudice awareness as the outcome variable,
and including as predictor variables the endorsement
ratings (level 1) as well as all individual difference
(level 2) variables and their interaction terms with
prejudice endorsement that proved to be meaningful
moderators in the separate analyses.9 Interaction
effects of endorsement ratings and IM, EM and ES,
respectively, remained largely uniform. With increas-
ing IM and ES, the intra-individual association
between prejudice endorsement and prejudice aware-
ness became more pronounced and negative (b ¼
.038, SE ¼ .017; and b ¼ .038, SE ¼ .017, respect-
ively). Also, with higher levels of EM, endorsement
and awareness ratings were less strongly negatively
associated, and more unrelated within individuals (b
¼ .045, SE ¼ .017). However, the interactive effect of
prejudice endorsement and SDO and HE vanished in
the full model (b¼ .009, SE ¼ .018; and b¼ .010, SE
¼ .018, respectively). Compared to the first model
including only prejudice endorsement as a (level 1)
predictor variable for prejudice awareness
(BIC¼ 8,583.551), the full model exhibited an
increased fit with the data (BIC¼ 8,514.511).
Additionally, the inclusion of the individual difference
(level 2) variables and their cross-level interaction
effects with prejudice endorsement (level 1) contrib-
uted to the explanation of random slope variance, that
was reduced by 8.62% from .058 (Model 1) to .053 in
the full model (Model 8).10
Discussion
In line with our hypotheses, results from Study 1
overall showed a moderate, negative intra-individual
association between prejudice endorsement and preju-
dice awareness. The more individuals agreed with an
ethnically prejudicial statement, the less they tended
to evaluate this statement as xenophobic. In line with
our predictions derived from a cognitive consistency
perspective, the inconsistency of prejudice endorse-
ment and prejudice awareness seems to depend on
personal standards, condemning or condoning the pri-
vate endorsement of ethnic prejudice. Indeed, our
findings revealed that the negative association of
prejudice endorsement and prejudice awareness was
more pronounced for individuals with higher egalitar-
ian and lower anti-egalitarian standards and motiva-
tions. With higher levels of internal motivation to
respond without prejudice (IM), egalitarian self-per-
ception (ES) and humanitarianism-egalitarianism
(HE), and with lower levels of social dominance
orientation (SDO) and external motivation to respond
without prejudice (EM), individuals more strongly
evaluated the prejudicial beliefs they personally
endorsed as not xenophobic. However, contrary to
our hypotheses, individual levels of protestant work
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ethic (PWE) did not substantially moderate the
intra-individual association between prejudice
endorsement and prejudice awareness. Also, the size
of the moderating effect of SDO and HE decreased
and became negligible, when simultaneously including
interactive effects of IM, ES and EM in the analyses.
This suggests that the (in)consistency of prejudice
endorsement and prejudice awareness does not
depend on general (anti-)egalitarian value orienta-
tions, but rather on their specific self-directed implica-
tions, as implied by self-related standards and
motivations, such as IM, ES, and EM, that are particu-
larly concerned with the personal endorsement of eth-
nic prejudice.
Overall, the findings from Study 1 corroborate a
cognitive consistency approach to prejudice-related
belief systems, suggesting that the subtlety of own eth-
nically prejudicial opinions indeed depends on (self-
related) anti-prejudice standards. Individuals with
high egalitarian standards, for whom this is relevant
for the consistency of their belief system, seem to
more strongly monitor the potentially prejudicial
nature of their own opinions, in the first place, and
endorse explicit prejudicial beliefs only to the extent
that they are unaware of their xenophobic nature.
Due to the correlational nature of these data, we
could, however, not unequivocally conclude that indi-
vidual egalitarian values actually have a causal role in
determining the intra-individual inconsistency, i.e.,
the negative association, of prejudice endorsement
and prejudice awareness. In order to further examine
this causal mechanism, we conducted a second study
using an experimental research design. Additionally,
since the moderating effects of (anti-)egalitarian
standards found here are small, we sought to gain fur-
ther confidence in their meaningfulness by replicating
the current findings within this second study.
Study 2
The goal of the second study is twofold. First, it aims
to replicate the main findings from Study 1 based on
data from an online survey. Second and most import-
antly, Study 2 seeks to extend the correlational find-
ings from Study 1 by providing experimental evidence
for the cognitive consistency perspective regarding the
causal impact of egalitarian, prejudice-condemning
values on the intra-individual association between
prejudice endorsement and prejudice awareness.
Specifically, we investigate in how far the salience of
egalitarian standards triggers a stronger monitoring of
own beliefs as potentially prejudiced as a means to
establish consistency with these salient standards,
which would be mirrored by a stronger negative
intra-individual association between prejudice
endorsement and prejudice awareness. In this logic,
individuals for whom egalitarian standards are made
salient should—in order to be consistent with these
standards—mostly endorse prejudicial beliefs only to
the degree that they are unaware of their prejudi-
cial content.
Adapting procedures that have been widely
employed within previous studies, we experimentally
manipulated the temporary salience of egalitarian
standards in two ways. In one experimental condition,
people were asked to describe failures to live up to
egalitarian anti-prejudice standards in reflecting upon
situations in which they exhibited ethnically preju-
diced reactions (egalitarian standard failure condition;
see e.g., Monteith, Mark, & Ashburn-Nardo, 2010;
Moskowitz, 2002; Moskowitz & Li, 2011; Moskowitz,
Li, Ignarri, & Stone, 2011). In the second experimental
condition, people were asked to recall successful
adherence to egalitarian standards, describing situa-
tions when they reacted in completely unprejudiced
ways towards migrants (egalitarian standard affirm-
ation condition; see e.g., Moskowitz, 2002; Moskowitz
et al., 2011; Moskowitz & Li, 2011).
Informed by previous findings (e.g., Fehr &
Sassenberg, 2010; Monteith et al., 2010; Monteith &
Mark, 2005; Moskowitz, 2002; Moskowitz et al., 2011;
Moskowitz & Li, 2011) and based on a cognitive con-
sistency perspective (Festinger, 1957; as well as in line
with related frameworks by Higgins, 1987; Wicklund
& Gollwitzer, 1981, 1982), we reason that the egalitar-
ian standard failure manipulation would—in the sense
of an average treatment effect across participants—
disturb participants’ cognitive consistency in making
people aware of a discrepancy between egalitarian
standards and their described prejudiced reactions.
The awareness of this discrepancy should be uncom-
fortable, as mirrored by increased negative affective
reactions, and should trigger individual compensatory
mechanisms. These compensatory responses should,
in turn, be aimed at restoring cognitive consistency,
i.e., the consistency with these salient egalitarian
standards, and an unprejudiced self-image. We
hypothesize that the salience of egalitarian standards
would become manifest in an increased self-monitoring
of own beliefs as potentially ethnically prejudiced
and hence a stronger negative intra-individual associ-
ation between prejudice endorsement and prejudice
awareness for individuals in the egalitarian standard
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failure compared to individuals in the control
condition.11
Regarding the egalitarian standard affirmation con-
dition, we have competing hypotheses. On the one
hand, when regarding personal egalitarian standards
(or an egalitarian self-image) in terms of a goal indi-
viduals pursue (e.g., Wicklund & Gollwitzer, 1981,
1982), one might argue that affirming people as
unprejudiced can, in satisfying personal goals to be
egalitarian or suggesting that one already lives up to a
valued egalitarian self-image, shut down the further
active pursuit of these egalitarian standards. Indeed,
previous research has shown that such an affirmation
of being egalitarian can subsequently undermine regu-
latory efforts to control stereotyping processes (e.g.,
on reaction time tasks; Moskowitz, 2002; Moskowitz
et al., 2011; Moskowitz & Li, 2011), or have a so-
called licensing effect leading to increased prejudiced
responding on subsequent explicit prejudice measures
(on which responses were ambiguous regarding the
extent to which they were perceived as reflective of
prejudice by the participants; Monin & Miller, 2001).
From this perspective, one might assume that people
in the egalitarian standard affirmation condition
would feel so confident about themselves in already
successfully fulfilling their personal egalitarian stand-
ards, that they would be even less likely than those in
the egalitarian standard failure and even in the control
condition to actively pursue these egalitarian stand-
ards. This would lead to a decreased self-monitoring
of own opinions as potentially prejudiced and thus a
less negative intra-individual association between
prejudice endorsement and awareness (licensing
hypothesis). In contrast, however, when considering
that individuals seek to avoid inconsistencies between
standards, values, and beliefs they hold as well as
behaviors they exhibit (Festinger, 1957)—or aim to
reduce discrepancies with valued self-images they seek
to attain (Higgins, 1987; Wicklund & Gollwitzer,
1981, 1982)—one might predict that reminding people
of past unprejudiced reactions would make individuals
less likely to subsequently show explicit responses that
would obviously contradict a previously affirmed
egalitarian self-image and would thus potentially lead
to cognitive dissonance (see Mullen & Monin, 2016,
for a discussion of consistency and licensing effects).
Thus, the salience of egalitarian standards induced by
reflections on past unprejudiced behavior might cause
a motivated response behavior aimed at preserving
cognitive consistency, i.e., the consistency with these
egalitarian standards, and at maintaining an unpreju-
diced self-image. From this perspective, we would
predict that people in the egalitarian standard affirm-
ation condition might exhibit a stronger critical
self-monitoring of personal beliefs as potentially eth-
nically prejudiced and thus a stronger negative intra-
individual association between prejudice endorsement
and prejudice awareness compared to the control con-
dition (positive consistency hypothesis).11
Method
Participants and procedure
Data were collected as an online survey by a profes-
sional survey institute, which distributed the survey
among participants from a German online access
panel. This had the advantage of being able to draw a
sample that is age- and gender-representative of the
general population. Participation in the survey was
entirely voluntary and participants could quit the
interview at any time. Individuals who sign up for the
online access panel collect points for participating in
studies, which they can later exchange for vouchers,
money, or donations.
In order to avoid suggesting a relationship between
the self-report measures on individuals’ prior egalitar-
ian standards and the experimental manipulation of
egalitarian standards salience, participants were told
that they would participate in a study consisting of
two separate parts, with the first assessing personal
characteristics and aspects they consider important in
life, and the second assessing opinions on different
social and political topics such as migration. In the
first part of the survey, egalitarian standards of the
participants were assessed, i.e., internal (IM) and
external motivation (EM) to respond without preju-
dice and egalitarian self-perception (ES) as the most
important constructs from Study 1. Then, empathy
was assessed with three subscales (12 items) of the
German version of the Interpersonal Reactivity Index
(Davis, 1983; German version: Paulus, 2009), which
solely served as a neutral filler between the assessment
of egalitarian standards and the experimental manipu-
lation and is therefore not further reported on.
Participants were then randomly assigned to one of
three conditions: the two experimental conditions, i.e.,
the egalitarian standard failure condition and the
egalitarian standard affirmation condition, and a neu-
tral control condition. After that, they were first asked
in how far they experienced different affective states
(i.e., negative self-directed affect, discomfort and posi-
tive affect), which served as a manipulation check for
the egalitarian standard failure condition (T1). Then,
participants should indicate their agreement with
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different prejudice items (prejudice endorsement) that
varied in the strength of their prejudicial content.
The items were similar to those used in Study 1, but
the list of items was more extensive (see below). Next,
socio-demographic characteristics were obtained.
Subsequently, participants were informed that they
would now be exposed to the same prejudice items
they had evaluated beforehand, but should now give a
different judgment, indicating in how far they evaluate
these statements as xenophobic (prejudice awareness).
Thereafter, the affect measure was administered for a
second time (T2).12
The complete sample (after excluding one partici-
pant with only missing values on the outcome vari-
able) comprised 1,201 participants (597 women, 604
men, 0 diverse/no indication; Mage¼ 44.62 years,
SD¼ 14.80, age range: 18–69 years), with subsamples
of n¼ 450 in the egalitarian standard failure, n¼ 259
in the egalitarian standard affirmation, and n¼ 492 in
the control condition. Before running our analyses, we
examined the content of the descriptions that partici-
pants provided in the three conditions to be able to
identify those individuals who did not properly fulfill
the tasks used for the experimental manipulations,
which was essential for the successful induction of
egalitarian standards salience. Although this has not
been explicitly reported as a problem in previous
studies using this manipulation of egalitarian stand-
ards with student samples (e.g., Monteith et al., 2010;
Moskowitz, 2002; Moskowitz et al., 2011; Moskowitz
& Li, 2011), our qualitative examination of the
descriptions revealed that participants from this age-
and gender-representative sample did not uniformly
comply with the given instructions, especially in the
two experimental conditions. We therefore decided to
conduct our analyses and report the results both, on
the full sample and on a ‘cleaner’ version of the sam-
ple, henceforth referred to as complete sample and
adjusted sample, respectively. In order to avoid the
exclusion of too many cases also within the adjusted
sample, we decided to only remove the data from
those individuals who provided an unequivocally
improper answer or no description at all for the tasks
given. Based on this general premise, we identified
313 participants (26.06%) and excluded their records
in the adjusted sample (although not further dis-
cussed, a comparable percentage of data exclusions
has, for instance, also been reported by Moskowitz &
Li, 2011, Study 1). The detailed criteria for the data
exclusions in the three conditions and the number of
excluded cases are presented in Table A2 in the sup-
plemental material. The adjusted sample comprised
888 participants (456 women, 432 men, 0 diverse/
no indication; Mage¼ 43.96 years, SD¼ 14.95, age
range: 18–69 years), with subsamples of n¼ 257 in
the egalitarian standard failure, n¼ 168 in the egali-
tarian standard affirmation and n¼ 463 in the con-
trol condition, respectively.
Experimental materials
Adapting experimental procedures from previous
research (Monteith et al., 2010; Moskowitz, 2002;
Moskowitz et al., 2011; Moskowitz & Li, 2011), partic-
ipants in the egalitarian standard failure condition
were instructed to describe a situation from their past,
in which they caught themselves showing a reaction
(e.g., thoughts, feelings, or a behavior) towards
migrants that was unjustly based on negative prejudice
and thus contradicted values of tolerance and egalitar-
ianism. If they could not remember a specific situ-
ation, participants were instructed to describe in
general how they might behave in prejudiced ways
towards migrants. Adapting the manipulation
employed by Moskowitz and colleagues (Moskowitz,
2002; Moskowitz et al., 2011; Moskowitz & Li, 2011),
the instructions in the egalitarian standard affirmation
condition were constructed analogously, but here par-
ticipants were asked to describe how they have reacted
towards migrants in unprejudiced ways and have thus
lived up to values of tolerance and egalitarianism. In
the control condition, participants were asked to
remember when they went grocery shopping and
should describe how they handled the payment at the
supermarket checkout. In order to increase the likeli-
hood that participants would carefully read the
instructions, they could only continue the survey after
having spent one minute on the page with these
experimental and control group tasks.
Measures
Level 1 variables (item ratings nested within
respondents)
Prejudice endorsement. Participants were asked to
evaluate 15 prejudice items, all of them representing
negative attitudes towards migrants in Germany.
Amongst them were the same four prejudice items
from the Subtle and Blatant Prejudice Scale (Pettigrew
& Meertens, 1995) as employed in Study 1. The
remaining items were either taken from existing scales
or self-developed, covering different migration-related
topics such as economy, culture and inner security.
The complete list of items and their sources is
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presented in Table A3 of the supplemental material.
As in Study 1, only items were selected for which the
wording was logically sound for endorsement as well
as awareness ratings. Besides these theoretical criteria,
the selection of the additional items was also based on
the average xenophobia ratings they received on a
separate pretest.13 We chose items that differed in the
strength of their prejudicial content, thus covering a
range from having been judged as rather not xeno-
phobic to very xenophobic on that pretest. The main
purpose of this item selection was to again ensure suf-
ficient within-subject variation in item ratings, which
was essential for this study. Participants indicated
their agreement with the prejudice items on a 1 (com-
pletely disagree) to 5 (completely agree) scale. Mean
endorsement ratings and standard deviations for these
items ranged between M¼ 2.09, SD ¼ 1.05 for the
item with the lowest and M¼ 3.86, SD ¼ 1.04 for the
item with the highest average level of endorsement
across participants in the complete sample (adjusted
sample: between M¼ 1.93, SD ¼ 1.07 and M¼ 3.82,
SD ¼ 1.03, respectively).
Prejudice awareness. Afterwards, participants indi-
cated for the same 15 prejudice items, in how far they
evaluate these as xenophobic on a 1 (not xenophobic
at all) to 5 (very xenophobic) scale. Mean awareness
ratings and standard deviations for these items ranged
between M¼ 2.34, SD ¼ 1.11 for the item with the
lowest and M¼ 3.81, SD ¼ 1.31 for the item with the
highest average awareness rating across participants in
the complete sample (adjusted sample: between
M¼ 2.35, SD¼ 1.10 and M¼ 4.00, SD¼ 1.23,
respectively).
As in Study 1, endorsement and awareness ratings
for all prejudice items were treated as separate obser-
vations clustered within individuals in our analyses
and were thus not averaged per respondent.
Level 2 (individual difference) variables
Internal and external motivation to respond without
prejudice. Participants’ motivations to respond with-
out prejudice were assessed with the full IM and EM
scale (Plant & Devine, 1998), which were translated
into German and rephrased to assess motivations to
control prejudice towards migrants. The IM (complete
sample: M¼ 3.54, SD¼ 1.03, a¼ .92; adjusted sample:
M¼ 3.67, SD¼ 0.99, a¼ .92) and EM (complete sam-
ple: M¼ 2.61, SD¼ 0.80, a¼ .72; adjusted sample:
M¼ 2.58, SD¼ 0.78, a¼ .71) items were averaged for
each individual. Respondents indicated their
agreement with the respective items on a 1 (completely
disagree) to 5 (completely agree) scale.
Egalitarian self-perception. Respondents’ ES was
measured with same item as in Study 1 (complete
sample: M¼ 4.01, SD¼ 1.02; adjusted sample:
M¼ 4.15, SD¼ 0.93). Respondents indicated their
agreement on a 1 (completely disagree) to 5 (com-
pletely agree) scale.
Affect. As manipulation checks for the egalitarian
standard failure condition we included measures of
respondents’ affect at two time points, i.e., immediately
after the manipulation and control tasks (T1) and after
the assessment of prejudice endorsement and prejudice
awareness (T2). Adapting items from Monteith (1993,
1996), three different affective responses were meas-
ured with five items each: Negative self-directed affect
(guilty, annoyed with myself, shameful, disappointed
with myself, self-critical; T1: complete sample:
M¼ 1.85, SD¼ 0.79, a¼ .87; adjusted sample:
M¼ 1.82, SD¼ 0.77, a¼ .86), discomfort (bothered,
uneasy, uncomfortable, tense, and anxious; T1: com-
plete sample: M¼ 2.10, SD¼ 0.87, a¼ .87; adjusted
sample: M¼ 2.04, SD¼ 0.84, a¼ .87) and positive
affect (friendly, happy, optimistic, content, good; T1:
complete sample: M¼ 3.26, SD¼ 0.88, a¼ .89; adjusted
sample: M¼ 3.29, SD¼ 0.89, a¼ .90). Respondents
rated on a 1 (not at all) to 5 (very) scale, in how far
they experienced these affective states at the moment.
Data structure and analytic strategy
Most importantly, also in Study 2, we aim to assess
the intra-individual association of the endorsement of
the different prejudice items and the evaluation of the
same items as xenophobic (prejudice awareness), and
again treated the 15 endorsement and awareness rat-
ings for the prejudice items as paired repeated
observations clustered within participants. Within this
two-level hierarchical data structure, 18,015 paired
endorsement and awareness ratings (level 1) were
nested within 1,201 respondents (level 2) (adjusted
sample: 13,320 awareness ratings were clustered within
888 respondents). First, we intended to replicate the
findings from Study 1, by conducting the same multi-
level regression analyses for participants in the control
condition of Study 2. Second, we assessed the causal
impact of the experimental induction of egalitarian
standards salience on the intra-individual association
between prejudice endorsement and prejudice aware-
ness. To this end, we again estimated multilevel
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regression models with prejudice awareness as the
outcome and prejudice endorsement as the predictor
variable (level 1), now including cross-level interac-
tions with the condition, participants were assigned to,
as a categorical predictor variable on level 2. Again, all
multilevel models were estimated with maximum likeli-
hood estimation and unrestricted covariance between
the random effects using the xtmixed command in
Stata (Version 15.1; StataCorp, 2017). For the assess-
ment of the affective reactions in the three conditions,
OLS regression models were estimated with affect
measures (T1 and T2, respectively) as the outcome var-
iables and condition as the categorical predictor vari-
able. For all multilevel and OLS regression models
reported here, the outcome and continuous predictor
variables were z-standardized on their respective level
of analysis and on the sample (i.e., complete or
adjusted) to which is referred to, beforehand.
Results
Replication of findings from Study 1
In order to replicate the main findings from Study 1,
we first ran the same multilevel regression models
from Study 1 for participants in the control condition
of the complete sample (n¼ 7,380 item ratings clus-
tered within n¼ 492 participants) and the adjusted
sample (n¼ 6,945 item ratings clustered within
n¼ 463 participants). The simple intra-individual
effect of prejudice endorsement on prejudice
awareness, which we first estimated based on a model
without any control variables, was negative and of
moderate size (b¼.475, SE¼ .018; adjusted sample:
b¼.482, SE¼ .017; see Table 2). We then again
included a categorical control variable for the specific
prejudice items in the main models reported hereafter
(Models 1–5; see Table 3 (complete sample) and Table 4
(adjusted sample)). Further corroborating findings
from Study 1, the analyses revealed a negative main
effect of prejudice endorsement on prejudice awareness
(Model 1; b¼.357, SE¼ .018; adjusted sample:
b¼.354, SE¼ .018), i.e., a moderate negative intra-
individual association between prejudice endorsement
and awareness: The more individuals endorsed a preju-
dicial belief, the less they thus evaluated the same belief
as xenophobic. Models including cross-level interaction
terms further corroborated the moderating role of indi-
vidual (anti-)egalitarian standards and motivations on
the intra-individual association between prejudice
endorsement and prejudice awareness. An increase in
the endorsement of a prejudice item was more strongly
related to a decrease in prejudice awareness for the
same item for individuals with higher levels of IM
(Model 2; b¼.070, SE¼ .016; adjusted sample:
b¼.059, SE¼ .015) and ES (Model 3; b¼.072,
SE¼ .017; adjusted sample: b¼.055, SE¼ .015).
Moreover, endorsement and awareness ratings were
intra-individually less negatively associated and more
unrelated with increasing levels of EM (Model 4;
b¼ .060, SE¼ .017; adjusted sample: b¼ .055,
Table 3. Replication of Study 1’s multilevel regression analyses of the intra-individual effect of prejudice endorsement (level 1)
and its cross-level interaction with individual difference characteristics (level 2) on prejudice awareness (control condition, com-
plete sample).
Model 0 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Parameters and variables b (SE) b (SE) b (SE) b (SE) b (SE) b (SE)
Fixed
Level 1
Intercept .077 (.033) .079 (.036) .100 (.033) .084 (.035) .081 (.035) .098 (.033)
Prejudice endorsement .357 (.018) .342 (.018) .347 (.018) .353 (.018) .338 (.017)
Level 2
IM .298 (.024) .282 (.034)
ES .217 (.026) .007 (.035)
EM .090 (.027) .058 (.024)
Cross-level interactions:
Prejudice endorsement x
IM .070 (.016) .059 (.023)
ES .072 (.017) .029 (.023)
EM .060 (.017) .062 (.016)
Random Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate
Random intercept (r0
2) .515 (.035) .332 (.024) .250 (.018) .290 (.021) .322 (.023) .246 (.018)
Random slope (r1
2) .097 (.008) .092 (.008) .093 (.008) .094 (.008) .088 (.008)
Covariance (r01
2) .015 (.010) .005 (.009) .001 (.009) .021 (.010) .001 (.008)
Residual variance .478 (.008) .254 (.004) .254 (.004) .254 (.004) .254 (.004) .254 (.004)
ICC .518
BIC 16,924.980 13,159.780 13,030.500 13,101.580 13,151.580 13,044.290
Deviance 16,898.265 12,981.645 12,834.561 12,905.636 12,955.637 12,812.719
Based on n¼ 7,380 item ratings clustered within n¼ 492 participants. Predictor and outcome variables were z-standardized on their respective level of
analysis and on the complete sample. Models 1–5 included a categorical control variable for the prejudice items. The BIC and deviance (2 log-likeli-
hood) statistics give an indication of model fit, with lower values representing a better fit.
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SE¼ .016). Within the final model (Model 5), including
all three interaction terms, the interactive effects of IM
and EM with prejudice endorsement remained robust
(b¼.059, SE¼ .023 (adjusted sample: b¼.056,
SE¼ .021); and b¼ .062, SE¼ .016 (adjusted sample:
b¼ .056, SE¼ .016), respectively), whereas the size of
the interactive effect of prejudice endorsement and ES
decreased (b¼.029, SE¼ .023; adjusted sample:
b¼.015, SE¼ .021). Compared to the first model
including only prejudice endorsement as a (level 1) pre-
dictor variable for prejudice awareness (BIC¼ 13,159.780;
adjusted sample: BIC¼ 12,475.550), the full model exhib-
ited and increased fit with the data (BIC¼ 13,044.290;
adjusted sample: BIC¼ 12,365.470). Additionally, the
inclusion of the individual difference (level 2) variables
an their cross-level interaction effects with prejudice
endorsement (level 1) contributed to the explanation of
random slope variance, which was reduced by 9.28%
(adjusted sample: 7.95%) from Model 1 to Model 5.14
Experimental results
Manipulation checks
Results from OLS regression analyses (see Table A6 in
the supplemental material) reveal that the egalitarian
standard failure manipulation—compared to the con-
trol condition—increased negative self-directed affect
(b¼ .389, SE¼ .064; adjusted sample: b¼ .613,
SE¼ .075) as well as feelings of discomfort (b¼ .235,
SE¼ .065; adjusted sample: b¼ .323, SE¼ .077), and
decreased positive affect (b¼.346, SE¼ .064; adjusted
sample: b¼.444, SE¼ .076) immediately after the
experimental manipulation (T1). Only small differences
in affect were observed between participants in the
egalitarian standard affirmation and the control condi-
tion (bs between .048 and .153; adjusted sample: bs
between .009 and .089). This indicates that the egalitar-
ian standard failure manipulation indeed triggered an
emotionally aversive state of cognitive dissonance. The
same OLS regression models with affect at T2, i.e., after
participants gave their prejudice endorsement and
prejudice awareness ratings, showed a reduction of cog-
nitive dissonance for participants in the egalitarian
standard failure condition. Although they still exhibited
somewhat increased negative self-directed affect
(b¼ .110, SE¼ .065; adjusted sample: b¼ .242,
SE¼ .077) and lower positive affect (b¼.179,
SE¼ .065; adjusted sample: b¼.232, SE¼ .077) at T2
than participants in the control condition, these differ-
ences were yet substantially smaller than at T1.
Differences in experienced discomfort between partici-
pants in the egalitarian standard failure condition and
the control group almost vanished at T2 (b¼ .036,
SE¼ .065; adjusted sample: b¼ .079, SE¼ .078). This
indicates that participants’ responses between T1 and
T2 alleviated the aversive affective consequences of the
egalitarian standard failure manipulation task. As at T1,
only small differences in affect were observed at T2
Table 4. Replication of Study 1’s multilevel regression analyses of the intra-individual effect of prejudice endorsement (level 1)
and its cross-level interaction with individual difference characteristics (level 2) on prejudice awareness (control condition,
adjusted sample).
Model 0 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Parameters and variables b (SE) b (SE) b (SE) b (SE) b (SE) b (SE)
Fixed
Level 1
Intercept .131 (.034) .061 (.037) .113 (.034) .088 (.035) .062 (.036) .111 (.034)
Prejudice endorsement .354 (.018) .345 (.018) .350 (.018) .352 (.017) .344 (.017)
Level 2
IM .294 (.024) .267 (.033)
ES .215 (.025) .025 (.033)
EM .090 (.028) .063 (.024)
Cross-level interactions:
Prejudice endorsement x
IM .059 (.015) .056 (.021)
ES .055 (.015) .015 (.021)
EM .055 (.016) .056 (.016)
Random Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate
Random intercept (r0
2) .505 (.035) .327 (.024) .242 (.018) .281 (.021) .316 (.024) .237 (.018)
Random slope (r1
2) .088 (.008) .084 (.008) .086 (.008) .086 (.008) .081 (.008)
Covariance (r01
2) .023 (.010) .006 (.008) .011 (.009) .029 (.010) .010 (.008)
Residual variance .491 (.009) .259 (.005) .258 (.005) .258 (.005) .259 (.005) .258 (.005)
ICC .507
BIC 16,095.600 12,475.550 12,351.250 12,418.770 12,467.270 12,365.470
Deviance 16,069.062 12,298.639 12,156.645 12,224.164 12,272.667 12,135.476
Based on n¼ 6,945 item ratings clustered within n¼ 463 participants. Predictor and outcome variables were z-standardized on their respective level of
analysis and on the adjusted sample. Models 1–5 included a categorical control variable for the prejudice items. The BIC and deviance (2 log-likeli-
hood) statistics give an indication of model fit, with lower values representing a better fit.
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between participants in the egalitarian standard affirm-
ation and the control condition (bs between .063 and
.149; adjusted sample: bs between .041 and .114).
Impact of egalitarian standards salience
We initially ran the analyses to examine the impact of
the egalitarian standard manipulation based on the
complete, unadjusted sample. Multilevel models were
calculated with prejudice awareness as the outcome
variable and the endorsement for the prejudice items
as the predictor variable (level 1). A model containing
no control variables overall revealed a negative ‘raw’
intra-individual effect of prejudice endorsement on
prejudice awareness (b¼.493, SE¼ .011; see Table 2,
left panel). We then conducted the main analyses, includ-
ing a categorical control variable for the prejudice items
in the models (Models 1–2; see Table 5, left panel). Model
1 revealed a negative main effect of prejudice endorse-
ment on prejudice awareness of moderate strength
(b¼.373, SE¼ .011), i.e., also across conditions there
was a negative intra-individual association between preju-
dice endorsement and awareness. In order to assess the
potential moderating effect of the condition on this asso-
ciation between prejudice endorsement and awareness,
we then calculated multilevel regression models with
prejudice awareness as the outcome variable, and preju-
dice endorsement (level 1) and condition (categorical level
2 variable) as well as their cross-level interaction term as
predictor variables (Model 2). This model, based on the
complete, unadjusted sample, revealed very small moder-
ating effects of egalitarian standards salience on the intra-
individual association between prejudice endorsement
and prejudice awareness. Participants in the egalitarian
standard failure condition exhibited a slightly stronger
negative intra-individual association between prejudice
endorsement and prejudice awareness (b¼.032,
SE¼ .023) compared to participants in the control condi-
tion. The same is true for individuals assigned to the egali-
tarian standard affirmation condition (b¼.015,
SE¼ .027; see also Table 2, left panel, for an overview on
the simple intra-individual effects of prejudice endorse-
ment on prejudice awareness, estimated based on separate
multilevel regression models for the three conditions con-
taining no control variables). These results might be inter-
preted as first, very tentative support for our hypotheses,
providing a rather conservative estimation of the effect of
the experimental conditions, since participants did not
uniformly fulfill the tasks employed for the experimental
manipulation of egalitarian standards salience.
We therefore conducted, in a second step, the same
analyses on the impact of the experimental manipula-
tion based on the adjusted sample, in which individu-
als who unequivocally disregarded the manipulation
instructions were excluded. The simple intra-
individual effect of prejudice endorsement on preju-
dice awareness estimated based on a model without
Table 5. Multilevel regression analyses of the effect of egalitarian standards salience on the intra-individual association between
prejudice endorsement prejudice awareness.
Complete sample Adjusted sample
Model 0 Model 1 Model 2 Model 0 Model 1 Model 2
Parameters and variables b (SE) b (SE) b (SE) b (SE) b (SE) b (SE)
Fixed
Level 1
Intercept .000 (.021) .154 (.023) .107 (.030) .000 (.023) .179 (.026) .098 (.031)
Prejudice endorsement .373 (.011) .357 (.017) .389 (.012) .348 (.016)
Level 2
Conditiona
Egalitarian standard failure .068 (.037) .169 (.043)
Egalitarian standard affirmation .101 (.044) .170 (.049)
Cross-level interactions:
Prejudice endorsement x
Conditiona
Egalitarian standard failure .032 (.023) .082 (.026)
Egalitarian standard affirmation .015 (.027) .078 (.030)
Random Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate
Random intercept (r0
2) .479 (.021) .298 (.014) .296 (.014) .449 (.023) .276 (.015) .270 (.015)
Random slope (r1
2) .084 (.005) .084 (.005) .073 (.005) .072 (.005)
Covariance (r01
2) .006 (.006) .006 (.006) .003 (.006) .000 (.006)
Residual variance .521 (.006) .288 (.003) .288 (.003) .551 (.007) .290 (.004) .290 (.004)
ICC .479 .449
BIC 42,644.120 33,714.790 33,746.100 32,184.330 24,927.380 24,931.370
Deviance 42,614.720 33,518.808 33,510.924 32,155.838 24,737.442 24,703.444
Based on N¼ 18,015 item ratings clustered within N¼ 1,201 participants (complete sample) or N¼ 13,320 item ratings clustered within N¼ 888 partici-
pants (adjusted sample). Continuous predictor and outcome variables were z-standardized on their respective level of analysis and on the respective
sample (i.e., complete or adjusted). Condition was entered as an unstandardized categorical variable. Models 1–2 included a categorical control variable
for the prejudice items. The BIC and deviance (2 log-likelihood) statistics give an indication of model fit, with lower values representing a better fit.
aReference category: Control condition.
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control variables was again negative and of moderate
strength (b¼.535, SE¼ .012; see Table 2, right
panel). The multilevel regression models for the main
analyses then included a categorical control variable
for the prejudice items (Models 1–2; see Table 5, right
panel). Model 1 also revealed a moderate negative
main effect of prejudice endorsement on prejudice
awareness (b¼.389, SE¼ .012), i.e., a negative intra-
individual association between prejudice endorsement
and awareness across conditions. Model 2 with preju-
dice awareness as the outcome variable, and prejudice
endorsement (level 1) and condition (categorical level
2 variable) as well as their cross-level interaction term
as predictor variables, showed that participants in the
egalitarian standard failure condition exhibited a
stronger negative intra-individual association between
prejudice endorsement and prejudice awareness
(b¼.082, SE¼ .026) compared to participants in the
control condition. The same is true for individuals
assigned to the egalitarian standard affirmation condi-
tion (b¼.078, SE¼ .030; see also Table 2, right panel,
for the simple intra-individual effects of prejudice
endorsement on prejudice awareness, estimated based
on separate multilevel regression models for the three
conditions containing no control variables). Thus, the
size of the moderating effects of egalitarian standards
salience on the intra-individual association between
prejudice endorsement and prejudice awareness
increased within these models based on the adjusted
sample compared to the models estimated based on the
complete, unadjusted sample.
Discussion
First, this second study was able to replicate findings
from Study 1—for participants in the control condi-
tion—based on data from an online survey. Again, we
overall found a negative intra-individual association
between prejudice endorsement and prejudice aware-
ness, which was of moderate strength and comparable
to the effect size found in Study 1. Also, results from
Study 2 could further corroborate a cognitive consist-
ency perspective on the mechanisms of subtle ethnic
prejudice. In line with results from Study 1, we found
that with higher self-related egalitarian standards and
motivations (i.e., IM and ES) and lower anti-
egalitarian standards (i.e., EM), the negative intra-
individual association between prejudice endorsement
and prejudice awareness became more pronounced.
Thus, as this is relevant for the consistency of their
belief system, individuals with higher standards that
condemn and lower standards that condone personal
endorsement of ethnic prejudice seemed to more
strongly monitor their own beliefs as potentially
prejudiced and were, in turn, more unaware of the
xenophobic content (or more convinced of the
unprejudicial nature) of the prejudicial beliefs they
did personally endorse. These small interactive effects
were also of comparable size for the two studies. The
only difference in the findings of the two studies is
that—unlike in Study 1—the size of the moderating
effect of ES decreased in Study 2 when all interactive
effects (i.e., IM, EM and ES with prejudice endorse-
ment, respectively) were included simultaneously in
the model.
Most importantly and extending these correlational
findings, Study 2 could provide experimental evidence
on the causal role of egalitarian standards in shaping
the intra-individual association between prejudice
endorsement and prejudice awareness. In line with
our prediction, participants in the egalitarian standard
failure condition exhibited a slightly stronger negative
intra-individual association between prejudice
endorsement and prejudice awareness compared to
individuals in the control condition. In this condition
the affect measures allowed us to trace the hypothe-
sized cognitive consistency mechanism behind the
egalitarian standards manipulation more narrowly:
Indeed, thinking about past prejudiced reactions ini-
tially caused cognitive dissonance (most importantly
reflected by increased levels of negative self-directed
affect), which was however alleviated after participants
had given their prejudice endorsement and awareness
ratings. This indicates that participants’ endorsement
and awareness ratings served as a compensatory
response to live up to egalitarian standards and to
restore cognitive consistency, i.e., the consistency with
these salient egalitarian standards. Furthermore, indi-
viduals in the egalitarian standard affirmation
condition overall exhibited a stronger negative intra-
individual association between prejudice endorsement
and prejudice awareness compared to control group
participants. This effect was of similar strength as the
effect of the egalitarian standard failure manipulation.
Thus, in line with our positive consistency hypothesis,
thinking about past instances of adherence to egalitar-
ian standards indeed led to an overall response pat-
tern of prejudice endorsement and awareness that
would further preserve the consistency between the
explicit evaluations of migration-related statements
and these egalitarian standards. The effects presented
here should thereby be regarded as average effects of
the experimental treatments across participants, with
the cognitive consistency mechanism hypothesized to
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underlie the induction of egalitarian standards salience
in the two experimental conditions being mainly
applicable to individuals with higher prior egalitarian
standards.11
Overall, the size of the effect of both egalitarian
standard manipulations should be interpreted with
some caution. Due to the observed difficulties for par-
ticipants in this population sample to fulfill the tasks
employed for the experimental manipulations, we
chose to present both, the effects of the experimental
conditions estimated based on the complete sample—
as rather attenuated effects, since participants who did
not fulfill the experimental task were included—, and
the effects estimated based on an adjusted sample,
excluding participants who unequivocally disobeyed
the instructions—as stronger effects, whereby however
a bias due to the selectivity of the compliers cannot be
completely ruled out. The size of the moderating effect
of the experimental manipulations on the intra-indi-
vidual association between prejudice endorsement and
awareness estimated based on the adjusted sample is
comparable to (or even a bit larger than) the size of the
moderating effects of a 1 SD-increase or 1 SD-decrease
in individual egalitarian (i.e., IM, and ES) or anti-egali-
tarian (i.e., EM) standards, respectively, as indicated by
the correlational findings in Study 1 and Study 2.
Despite these qualifications concerning the inter-
pretation of the effect sizes, the experimental findings
from Study 2 provide important first evidence on the
causal role of egalitarian standards in the cognitive
mechanism behind subtle ethnic prejudice. Results
could reveal that participants for whom egalitarian
standards were made salient—by reflecting upon
instances of past prejudiced or unprejudiced reac-
tions—exhibited a stronger negative intra-individual
association between prejudice endorsement and preju-
dice awareness. This suggests that the temporary sali-
ence of egalitarian, prejudice-condemning standards
indeed triggered or enhanced a self-monitoring of
own opinions as potentially prejudiced. Individuals for
whom anti-prejudice standards were made salient
devoted more vigilance to their evaluation of migra-
tion-related statements and endorsed prejudicial
beliefs only to the extent that they are unaware of
their xenophobic content, thereby establishing, i.e.,
restoring or preserving, consistency with these egali-
tarian standards.
General discussion
Since in today’s societies the endorsement of ethnic
prejudice is generally condemned by prevailing
egalitarian anti-prejudice norms, it seems intuitive
to assume and has been implied by previous social-
psychological research, that many individuals who
explicitly endorse ethnically prejudicial beliefs are
largely unaware of their xenophobic content, based on
the presumption that people would find it nowadays
rather aversive to perceive themselves (and also to be
perceived by others) as prejudiced. In that vein, it has
thus been suggested that one’s own ethnic prejudice is
likely to be subtle to oneself and that making individ-
uals aware of their own ethnically prejudicial beliefs is
therefore an effective means to motivate them to
reconsider their opinions. However, earlier studies
have actually not directly investigated how people
evaluate their own prejudicial opinions in the first
place, and whether the explicit endorsement of an eth-
nically prejudicial statement (prejudice endorsement)
and the simultaneous explicit evaluation of this belief
as xenophobic or racist (prejudice awareness) are
really rather inconsistent with each other.
Two studies addressed this issue, in examining the
intra-individual association between prejudice
endorsement and prejudice awareness, i.e., in how far
individuals do or do not judge ethnically prejudicial
statements they personally endorse as xenophobic.
Drawing on a cognitive consistency perspective (e.g.,
Festinger, 1957; Gawronski, 2012), we also investi-
gated in how far the association of prejudice endorse-
ment and prejudice awareness might depend on
individual standards and motivations condemning or
condoning the personal endorsement of ethnic preju-
dice (Study 1 and Study 2) or on the salience of these
standards (Study 2).
In line with the basic rationale underlying
approaches on contemporary forms of explicit ethnic
prejudice (e.g., McConahay, 1986; Pettigrew &
Meertens, 1995), our analyses in both studies, based
on data from a telephone and an online survey, over-
all reveal an inconsistency between prejudice endorse-
ment and prejudice awareness as indicated by their
negative intra-individual association: The more indi-
viduals agreed with an ethnically prejudicial statement,
the less they tended to evaluate this statement as
xenophobic. However, this negative intra-individual
relationship was only of moderate strength, and not
as strong as suggested by previous research that has
indirectly approached this question (e.g., Crandall
et al., 2002). Thus, our findings also indicate that
intra-individually, prejudice endorsement and preju-
dice awareness, despite being negatively related, are
not perfect mirror images of each other. Hence, one
can neither straightforwardly infer from the
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endorsement of an ethnically prejudicial statement
(e.g., in a survey) that individuals are unaware of its
xenophobic content, nor that people who reject such a
statement are necessarily aware that it represents eth-
nic prejudice.
Moreover, the correlational findings from both stud-
ies reveal that this negative intra-individual association
between prejudice endorsement and prejudice aware-
ness was more pronounced for individuals with higher
egalitarian and lower anti-egalitarian standards. Results
also indicated that especially self-related anti-prejudice
standards such as internal motivation to respond with-
out prejudice (IM) egalitarian self-perception (ES) and
external motivation to respond without prejudice
(EM), rather than general (anti-)egalitarian value orien-
tations, are important in shaping that association and
thus the (in)consistency of prejudice endorsement and
prejudice awareness. Thus, with higher self-related
standards that condemn (IM, ES) and lower standards
that condone (EM) the private endorsement of ethnic
prejudice—which might also be conceptualized as self-
determined standards to avoid personal prejudice
endorsement (Legault et al., 2007)—, individuals more
strongly evaluated the prejudicial beliefs they person-
ally endorsed as not xenophobic, being more unaware
of the prejudicial content of their own beliefs. These
findings are congruent with our hypotheses we devel-
oped from a cognitive consistency perspective (e.g.,
Festinger, 1957; Gawronski, 2012), in acknowledging
that being or perceiving oneself as unprejudiced is not
equally important to all individuals. For individuals
with higher standards condemning (and lower stand-
ards condoning) personal prejudice endorsement, on
the one hand, the endorsement of a belief and its sim-
ultaneous evaluation as xenophobic are logically incon-
sistent, in colliding with their personal egalitarian
values. In assuming that people would not endure the
aversive emotional state of cognitive dissonance result-
ing from this inconsistency, it makes sense that espe-
cially these individuals are initially more strongly
convinced that the prejudicial beliefs they endorse do
not represent ethnic prejudice, exhibiting a stronger
negative intra-individual association between prejudice
endorsement and prejudice awareness. In other words,
as it is relevant for the consistency of their belief sys-
tem, these individuals are more likely to engage in a
critical self-monitoring of own beliefs as potentially
prejudiced, so that they endorse a prejudicial statement
only to the extent that they are unaware of its prejudi-
cial content (or evaluate a prejudicial statement they
endorse as not xenophobic). On the other hand, for
individuals with lower egalitarian (or higher anti-
egalitarian) standards, the evaluation of own beliefs as
xenophobic should not collide with their personal val-
ues and should not cause cognitive inconsistency to the
same degree. These individuals are less likely to moni-
tor whether the beliefs they privately endorse are xeno-
phobic, as it is mirrored by the weaker negative intra-
individual association of prejudice endorsement and
prejudice awareness. These findings are, in general, also
congruent with basic assumptions from other frame-
works related to cognitive dissonance theory, such as
self-discrepancy theory (Higgins, 1987) or symbolic
self-completion theory (Wicklund & Gollwitzer, 1981,
1982). From these perspectives, especially individuals
for whom an ‘unprejudiced self’ represents an import-
ant, aspired self-definition or a personally relevant state
of the self they strive for would seek to reduce discrep-
ancies with this valued egalitarian self-representation,
as it would be empirically reflected in our studies by a
stronger negative association between prejudice
endorsement and prejudice awareness.
The second study extended the correlational find-
ings on the moderating impact of self-related egalitar-
ian standards, in examining their causal role in
initiating a self-monitoring process that entails a sim-
ultaneous consideration of prejudice endorsement and
prejudice awareness based on an experimental
research design. Indeed, our findings showed that the
induction of egalitarian standards salience, by asking
people to recall instances in which they behaved in
ethnically prejudiced (egalitarian standard failure con-
dition) or unprejudiced (egalitarian standard affirm-
ation condition) ways, led to a stronger negative
intra-individual association of prejudice endorsement
and prejudice awareness. Thus, the salience of egali-
tarian standards triggered a critical reflection of own
beliefs as potentially prejudiced as a cognitive process
that served to restore (egalitarian standard failure con-
dition) or preserve (egalitarian standard affirmation
condition) consistency with these activated standards.
In turn, individuals for whom egalitarian standards
were made salient were more unaware of the xeno-
phobic content (or more convinced of the unprejudi-
cial nature) of those prejudicial beliefs they did
personally endorse.
Although not the main purpose of our study, this
evidence on the impact of the egalitarian standard
affirmation condition can also contribute to previous
research that has brought forward conflicting findings
on consistency and licensing effects of previous moral
behavior (see Mullen & Monin, 2016, for a review).
Based on earlier research findings (Monin & Miller,
2001; Moskowitz, 2002; Moskowitz et al., 2011;
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Moskowitz & Li, 2011) and when regarding personal
egalitarian standards in terms of goals people pursue
(e.g., Wicklund & Gollwitzer, 1981, 1982), one could
have predicted that affirming people in already having
achieved the goal of being unprejudiced would subse-
quently shut down the pursuit of egalitarian standards
and the further monitoring of prejudiced responses.
In contrast, however, and in line with the perspective
that people would seek to avoid inconsistencies
between standards they hold and beliefs they express
(Festinger, 1957) or discrepancies with valued self-
images (Higgins, 1987; Wicklund & Gollwitzer, 1981,
1982), our findings reveal that the recall of the suc-
cessful adherence to egalitarian standards afterwards
led, in the sense of an average effect of the manipula-
tion across participants, to an increased critical moni-
toring of potentially prejudicial responses (i.e.,
positive consistency)—at least when these responses
are explicit in nature and might cause an unequivocal
inconsistency with the previously affirmed, salient
egalitarian standards or the affirmed unprejudiced
self-image (see e.g., also Monin & Miller, 2001, for
this discussion).
Overall, the correlational and experimental findings
from our two studies on the moderating role of per-
sonal egalitarian anti-prejudice standards (or the sali-
ence of such standards) in determining the strength of
the negative intra-individual association of prejudice
endorsement and prejudice awareness strongly corrob-
orate a cognitive consistency approach to prejudice-
related belief systems. Extending previous research in
directly investigating how people evaluate their own
ethnically prejudicial beliefs in the first place and how
this is determined by egalitarian standards, the current
study has, from a practical perspective, important
implications for real-world prejudice-reduction inter-
ventions. Our findings from both studies demonstrate
that those parts of anti-prejudice interventions (e.g.,
civic education campaigns) that aim to combat explicit
ethnic prejudice by making people aware of their own
prejudicial beliefs might be best suited for individuals
with self-standards and motivations that condemn the
private endorsement of (ethnic) prejudice, since they
seem to routinely monitor whether their own beliefs
are potentially prejudicial, and are initially, i.e., pri-
vately and prior to potential interventions, more
strongly unaware of the xenophobic nature of the
beliefs they personally endorse. This rationale is also
in line with research findings by Plant and Devine
(2009), who showed that individuals with primarily
internal standards to be unprejudiced are, by default,
not that interested in participating in prejudice
reduction programs, presumably convinced they do
not need such an assistance, yet are even more moti-
vated to take part in such programs, when made
aware of their own prejudice. In the light of our
results, we would argue that highly egalitarian individ-
uals might initially be in an ‘equilibrium state’ of cog-
nitive consistency, convinced that the explicit beliefs
they personally hold are not xenophobic, which might
to some degree also reflect a state of self-contentment.
Yet, it is exactly this equilibrium state that, when
being disturbed, provides a promising avenue for anti-
prejudice approaches. For individuals with lower egali-
tarian standards, for whom prejudice endorsement
and prejudice awareness are not that inconsistent and
who are not that unaware of the xenophobic nature of
the ethnically prejudicial beliefs they personally
endorse beforehand, it might be a better idea to first
strengthen exactly these self-standards that condemn
personal endorsement of ethnic prejudice, which rou-
tinely initiate a critical self-monitoring of personal
beliefs as potentially prejudiced.
From a theoretical and methodological perspective,
the current study also emphasizes the need for a dif-
ferentiated view on the subtlety of explicit ethnic
prejudice. When aiming to target ‘subtlety’ on the
individual level, in the sense of a person’s unaware-
ness that certain beliefs are reflective of ethnic preju-
dice, our findings show that this has to be assessed
directly and cannot simply be inferred from an indi-
vidual’s endorsement of certain opinions. Also, our
results on between-respondents differences in the
intra-individual association of prejudice endorsement
and prejudice awareness clearly reveal the necessity to
approach within-person dynamics in the subtlety of
(ethnic) prejudice in a direct manner (see e.g.,
Molenaar, 2004; Molenaar & Campbell, 2009, for this
methodological discussion). The current study shows
that the relationship between prejudice endorsement
and prejudice awareness is more complex on an intra-
personal level than one might indirectly conclude
from research operating at a higher or different level
of aggregation (e.g., Crandall et al., 2002; Swim
et al., 2005).
Limitations and future directions
Although providing important insights into cognitive
mechanisms behind the subtlety of ethnic prejudice,
this study nevertheless carries some limitations that
offer avenues for further research.
To begin with, it needs to be noted that we
adopted a simplistic view on cognitive (in)consistency
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here, for the sake of clarity, and that prejudice-related
belief systems are certainly in reality far more com-
plex, comprising a multitude of interrelated proposi-
tions. We do neither intend to imply that
propositions deriving from personal egalitarian stand-
ards, as the focus of the current study, are always uni-
formly accessible to individuals across different
situations, nor that they are the only relevant moder-
ating variables, and suggest that future research could
also examine other personal standards that potentially
determine the inconsistency (or even the consistency)
between prejudice endorsement and awareness, for
example individual motivations to (intentionally)
express prejudice (Forscher, Cox, Graetz, & Devine,
2015). Additionally, we emphasize that the cognitive
consistency perspective adopted here applies to private
contexts, i.e., how individuals evaluate different beliefs
on their own. We suppose that the degree to which
individuals would publicly express opinions they
endorse or would openly evaluate them as xenopho-
bic, is of course subject to other processes going
beyond this private logic of cognitive consistency. In
public contexts, the individual sensitivity to external
influences (e.g., social anti-prejudice norms) are likely
to play a role. We would, for instance, expect that
high-EM individuals might—in striving to keep up an
unprejudiced self-image in front of others—respond
differently in a public compared to the current, more
private survey setting, in monitoring their own beliefs
more strongly as potentially prejudicial or at least
labeling their own beliefs more strongly as not xeno-
phobic when their responses are observable by others.
Also, it needs to be emphasized that the logic of cog-
nitive consistency pertains to propositional processing
(e.g., Gawronski, 2012) and that the perspective
employed in this research thus specifically applies to
explicit prejudicial beliefs, as opinions to which indi-
viduals consciously assign a truth value by endorsing
or rejecting them. Beyond the scope of the current
studies it might, however, be an interesting avenue for
further investigations to extend the limited body of
research that targets from a cognitive consistency per-
spective, how people integrate implicit ethnically
prejudicial biases of which they might become aware
(e.g., automatic stereotypical thoughts or negative
affective or behavioral reactions) as propositional ele-
ments they reject or endorse into their belief systems
and how this might depend on their personal egalitar-
ian standards and motivations (see e.g., Gawronski &
Bodenhausen, 2014; Gawronski et al., 2008, for
this discussion).
Also, we cannot ultimately disentangle within our
study in how far, especially for individuals with highly
egalitarian self-standards, the evaluation of the preju-
dicial beliefs as not xenophobic represents ‘true’ or
‘naïve’ unawareness of their prejudicial nature or also
involves a strategic component, with individuals delib-
erately labeling their own opinions as not xenophobic
in order to prevent cognitive dissonance. We would
tentatively suggest that both is true to some degree:
Thus, we would assume that individuals who are
genuinely motivated to not be (ethnically) prejudiced
usually reject opinions they identify as xenophobic,
and are thus unaware of the prejudicial content of
those beliefs they do endorse and which have slipped
under their radar. But we also suspect that, at the
same time, these individuals might, if they do endorse
prejudicial beliefs and (maybe hesitantly) identify
them as such, also self-servingly define these beliefs as
not xenophobic (even if they might realize that most
others would) in order to avoid cognitive inconsist-
ency. However, further research is warranted to
investigate these two possible—self-critical and self-
presentational—mechanisms more in-depth. Relating
to this point, the current data do not allow us to draw
any causal inferences on whether individuals adapt
their endorsement of a prejudicial statement based on
whether they evaluate it as xenophobic or vice versa.
Indeed, our conclusions based on the cognitive con-
sistency perspective employed within this study are
independent of the direction of causation between
prejudice endorsement and prejudice awareness and
we would assume that the two judgments mutually
influence each other, with especially highly egalitarian
individuals indicating their endorsement with a state-
ment based on the concurrent evaluation of whether
it is xenophobic and vice versa. Nevertheless, it might
be interesting for future research to consider, whether
individuals endorse ethnically prejudicial beliefs
mainly because they are unaware that they are xeno-
phobic, or do not label their beliefs as xenophobic,
because they endorse them.
Additionally, since it was the main purpose of the
second study to establish the causal impact of egalitar-
ian standards salience on the intra-individual associ-
ation between prejudice endorsement and prejudice
awareness, we analyzed and presented the effects of
our manipulations as average treatment effects across
participants. However, it should be noted that the
hypothesized consistency mechanisms behind the
manipulations should be primarily applicable to indi-
viduals with high prior egalitarian standards. Since
such an analysis was beyond the scope of the current
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article, it would be worthwhile for future studies to
examine heterogeneous effects of the egalitarian stand-
ards manipulations employed here.
Moreover, there are some methodological aspects
of the current study that need to be critically reflected
on. First, the moderating effects of individual egalitar-
ian standards found in Study 1 and Study 2 and of
the experimentally induced egalitarian standards sali-
ence (Study 2) are small. On the one hand, we con-
sider these small effects meaningful and also plausible
in the context of the current study, as we expected the
intra-individual association between prejudice
endorsement and prejudice awareness to vary within a
restricted range. Thus, we predicted that the relation-
ship would inter-individually vary between a strongly
negative association and no association at all, but did
not suppose that people with low egalitarian standards
(or for whom egalitarian standards were not made
salient) would, in fact, show a positive relationship
between endorsement and awareness. On the other
hand, we however also think that the small effect sizes
might be attributed to the fact that egalitarian stand-
ards can only unfold their moderating impact for peo-
ple who are willing to engage in a self-monitoring of
their beliefs—an individual readiness that might not
be taken for granted. Future research might, for
instance, examine the role of individual differences in
need for cognition (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982) to inves-
tigate this potential mechanism further. Second, and
relating to this latter consideration, it needs to be
emphasized that the size of the effect of the experi-
mental manipulations in Study 2 should be inter-
preted with some caution, since the qualitative
examination of the material revealed that participants
did not uniformly comply with the self-reflection
instructions for the experimental tasks. Since such
problems to fulfill the task instructions did not arise
to the same degree within the control condition, we
think that the failure to describe instances of having
reacted in prejudiced (and also unprejudiced) ways
cannot be attributed to a general lethargy on behalf of
the online survey participants. It might rather reflect a
lack of readiness (or maybe also the inability) to
engage in critical self-monitoring of one’s own atti-
tudes and behaviors, especially regarding sensitive
issues such as (ethnic) prejudice. In fact, it follows
from the very cognitive consistency perspective
employed here itself that especially asking people to
recall instances in which they failed to live up to egali-
tarian standards (i.e., the exercise used for the egali-
tarian standard failure condition) might be a rather
challenging task, as it requires at least individuals who
strongly value egalitarian ideals to voluntarily lead
themselves into cognitive inconsistency and cognitive
dissonance, as an aversive state people mostly seek to
avoid. In the light of these considerations, future
experimental research using different experimental
designs, such as fake feedback manipulations or pri-
ming methods, into the effect of egalitarian standards
salience is definitely needed. Despite these cautionary
notes, we are nevertheless confident that the findings
from our experimental study provide first important
evidence on the causal role of egalitarian standards in
initiating a self-monitoring and balancing process
between prejudice endorsement and prejudice aware-
ness. Additionally, we think that the observed unwill-
ingness in parts of the sample to comply especially
with the experimental task instructions carry import-
ant methodological as well as theoretical implications.
First, they show that these widely used procedures
(Monteith et al., 2010; Moskowitz, 2002; Moskowitz
et al., 2011; Moskowitz & Li, 2011) to induce egalitar-
ian standards salience might not be readily applicable
beyond college samples. This stresses the importance
of conducting also experimental research with larger
samples that are more representative of the general
population. Second, the very fact that many people
especially in the egalitarian standard failure condition
seem to be reluctant to critically self-reflect their opin-
ions as potentially prejudiced is an important theoret-
ical finding in itself. It shows that engaging in self-
criticism and especially reflecting on violations of own
values, which is at the same time a crucial step for the
self-regulation of prejudicial responses and successful
adherence to egalitarian standards, is—in line with
basic assumptions of consistency frameworks—neces-
sarily a demanding endeavor. It could also indicate
that cognitive consistency processes in general, includ-
ing that of interest in the current article, which cru-
cially rely on the self-monitoring of own attitudes and
behaviors, might, in fact, be hard to observe or at least
hard to induce in larger parts of the gen-
eral population.
Conclusion
Despite these caveats, we believe that the current cor-
relational and experimental findings make an import-
ant contribution to social-psychological prejudice
research in shedding light on the intra-individual cog-
nitive dynamics that underlie the subtlety of explicit
ethnic prejudice and have been largely abandoned
within previous work. Proving the fruitfulness of
applying a cognitive consistency perspective, this
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research could reveal, based on two studies with large
population samples, that own ethnically prejudicial
beliefs indeed tend to be rather subtle to oneself, but
that the degree to which this is true depends on egali-
tarian standards related to the condemnation of per-
sonal prejudice endorsement. Our findings show that
individuals with high personal egalitarian standards
(or for whom these are made salient) more strongly
critically monitor their own opinions as potentially
prejudiced and endorse prejudicial beliefs only to the
extent that they are unaware of their xenophobic
nature, thereby maintaining a consistency with these
anti-prejudice standards. These results suggest that
making people aware of the prejudicial content of
their own opinions might not be an equally suitable
means to combat explicit ethnic prejudice for all indi-
viduals, but can be an especially effective method to
target people with highly egalitarian self-standards,
since they are more unaware of the prejudicial content
of their own views, in the first place.
Notes
1. We use the terms ethnic prejudice and xenophobia
here to refer to explicit negative attitudes directed at
ethnic or national minority groups, and refer to single
statements being reflective of such attitudes as
ethnically prejudicial beliefs or statements.
2. It should be noted, that the current article does not
target individuals’ (un)awareness of implicit, automatic
prejudicial biases they might exhibit (such as
automatic stereotypical thoughts or negative affective
or behavioral reactions), as for instance the bias
awareness scale (Perry, Murphy, & Dovidio, 2015) and
broadly also the should-would discrepancy
questionnaire (e.g. Devine, Monteith, Zuwerink, &
Elliot, 1991; Monteith & Voils, 1998) are concerned
with. In contrast to such approaches, the current
article specifically examines the potential
(un)awareness of individuals that their own explicit
ethnically prejudicial opinions, i.e., beliefs they
consciously endorse, are actually xenophobic and
reflective of ethnic prejudice.
3. Note that with this conceptualization of external
motivation to respond without prejudice as a standard
that condones personal endorsement of ethnic
prejudice we particularly refer to private settings, as it
has been found that especially individuals with a high
external (and low internal) motivation to be
unprejudiced—which might be conceptualized as
reflecting weakly self-determined anti-prejudice
standards (see also Legault, Green-Demers, Grant, &
Chung, 2007)—regulate ethnically prejudiced
responses less strongly in private contexts (e.g., Butz &
Plant, 2009). In public situations, we suppose that
(primarily) externally motivated individuals might
respond differently and potentially adjust their
responses in line with social anti-prejudice norms,
because in that case the explicit labeling own beliefs as
xenophobic or prejudicial in front of others would be
inconsistent with their externally oriented anti-
prejudice standards (see e.g., Butz and Plant, 2009,
and Plant and Devine, 1998, for findings on the
situational adjustment of prejudiced responses for
primarily high-EM individuals).
4. For the sake of simplicity, we treat prejudice
endorsement, prejudice awareness and endorsement of
(anti-)egalitarian values as binary variables, when
outlining our theoretical framework. However, we of
course acknowledge and methodologically
operationalize these constructs as continuous variables.
5. This study is based on a dual-frame (i.e., landline and
mobile phone) sample. The landline sample was drawn
based on the Gabler-H€ader procedure (H€ader &
Gabler, 1998) that randomly generates and selects
phone numbers. Random selection on the household
level was ensured by choosing the adult who had the
most recent birthday to answer the survey (Last-
Birthday-Method). The mobile phone sample was
drawn based on a similar procedure, however without
the application of the Last-Birthday-Method, assuming
that each mobile phone belongs to only
one individual.
6. We deliberately used the term ‘xenophobic’ as an
operationalization of prejudice awareness, since the
term ‘prejudiced’ in everyday language means (at least
in German) ‘untrue’, which would essentially refer to
the same thing as asking people about their personal
endorsement of different statements. The term
‘xenophobic’ rather implies that a statement is
‘reflective of a negative attitude towards migrants’,
which is more suitable in the context of the
current studies.
7. Although items were selected based on factor loadings
indicated by Plant and Devine (1998), especially the
internal reliability of the shortened EM scale was not
fully satisfactory. However, since alpha scores are
necessarily lower for shorter scales (e.g., Field, 2013)
and research with a population sample was
successfully conducted with only one of the two EM
items we selected (Abrams, Houston, van de Vyver, &
Vasiljevic, 2015), we considered these consistency
scores sufficient for further analyses.
8. We thereby followed the chronological order of their
assessment in the survey, although in general both
ways of association between prejudice endorsement
and prejudice awareness would be theoretically
plausible. However, it was not possible and not the
aim of the current analyses to establish a causal
relationship between the two variables. The models
reported in Table 1 do not substantially change when
entering prejudice endorsement as the outcome and
prejudice awareness as the predictor variable and are
presented in Table A1 in the supplemental material.
9. Results in Model 8 (Table 1) remained uniform when
also including PWE and its interaction term with
prejudice endorsement in the final model.
10. Results for the reported models in Table 1 were robust
when controlling for respondents’ gender, age,
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immigration background, education, and individual
levels of social desirability.
11. In line with the rationale put forward in this article,
the cognitive consistency mechanism assumed to
underlie the hypothesized effect of the two
experimental manipulations of egalitarian standards
salience should be mainly applicable to individuals
with high personal egalitarian standards, since only for
these individuals, awareness of own prejudiced
responses should represent a discrepancy with
personal standards. Thus, only for these individuals
should cognitive consistency, i.e., restoring, achieving
or preserving consistency with own anti-prejudice
standards, serve as a motivator to more strongly
regulate and critically monitor prejudice-related
responses in reaction to the two experimental tasks, as
potentially reflected by the predicted stronger negative
intra-individual association of prejudice endorsement
and prejudice awareness. However, although the
expected average treatment effects of the experimental
manipulations attributable to such cognitive
consistency mechanisms should be primarily driven by
the response behavior of individuals with initially high
personal egalitarian standards, it is nevertheless
possible that the tasks employed for the two
experimental conditions could also serve as a general
prime of egalitarianism. As indicated by other research
(e.g., Wyer, 2010), such a general egalitarian prime
might also lead to compliance for high-prejudiced
individuals or individuals with low personal egalitarian
or anti-prejudice standards, prompting them to
regulate and monitor prejudiced responses. From that
perspective, also these individuals might exhibit a
stronger negative intra-individual association of
prejudice endorsement and prejudice awareness in
reaction to the experimental tasks.
12. At the end of the survey, two items were administered
asking about participants’ general self-evaluations on
in how far they reflect their own beliefs as potentially
prejudiced. These items were not further analyzed
within this article.
13. Within this pretest, participants (N¼ 174) were asked
to rate 10 randomly selected items out of 51
statements relating to migrants on a 1 (not xenophobic
at all) to 5 (very xenophobic) scale. The items, ranging
from neutral to very xenophobic statements, were
either adapted from existing scales or self-developed.
14. The results were also uniform, when running the
analyses based on participants from all three
conditions, i.e., including also the two experimental
groups. The models reported in Tables 3 and 4 do not
substantially change when entering prejudice
endorsement as the outcome and prejudice awareness
as the predictor variable and are presented in Tables
A4 and A5 in the supplemental material.
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